Washington DC - The Caucasus war this summer pitted predominantly Christian Orthodox Georgia against predominantly Christian Orthodox Russia and the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, whose Christianity, Islam and traditional spirituality weave a complex tapestry of religions cutting across ethnic and political divides.

South Ossetia witnessed ethnic and political tensions over the past two decades, which came to a head in August. Each side has offered competing explanations for their military engagement. Georgian troops explain that they were fighting to repel Russian troops and secure territorial integrity. Abkhaz and South Ossetians tell us they were fighting against Georgian aggression and for self-determination. Russians say they were fighting to protect South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgian attacks and to establish a security buffer around them. 

Local peacebuilders also waged a peaceful struggle for a non-violent resolution of the disputes and lasting security for all parties involved.

Beyond official "track one" government-to-government discussions, such as the Geneva talks that convened briefly on 15 October and again on 19 November, long-term peace in the Caucasus will require more creative channels of communication to rebuild relationships across the conflict's divide. 

Unofficial "track two" diplomacy could augment the high-profile Geneva negotiations held earlier this week, in which participating diplomats seem to have made little progress towards an official agreement.

In a process complementary to official "track one" diplomacy, ongoing relationships between civil society peace builders across the Caucasus' diverse religious, geographic and ethnic communities provide a foundation on which Abkhaz, Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian political leaders can begin building sustainable peace.

Even while bombs were falling in August, and face-to face meetings were impossible, individual peace builders reached out to each other via phone, e-mail, and through the Caucasus Forum Yahoo! online group, lamented the war and its human cost, and presented widely divergent assessments of the causes of the war. While they disagree vigorously, these peacebuilders share a fundamental faith in each other's humanity.

This bridge at the civil society level is useful, but a stable peace will ultimately require that the political leadership learn from this example. Respectful, constructive conversation is possible across the conflict's divides when political leaders are willing to recognize the humanity of the other side.

These civil society leaders have developed a wealth of insights about the conflict's dynamics that could usefully inform political leaders' search for a way forward.  For example, over several discussions in unofficial peace-building dialogues during the course of the conflict, a Georgian NGO leader realized the importance of building the kind of Georgia in which Ossetians and Abkhaz might want to live, a Georgia with an impeccable human rights record, inclusive democratic rule, and respect for all ethnic groups. Others learned that sovereignty is not always an all-or-nothing affair.

But there is more.   

The same processes that have built this civil society bridge could also help politicians build lasting agreements. A series of periodic informal discussions in quiet retreat settings organized by trained facilitators is a tried and true method for building political agreements that meet everyone's needs.  Such discussions engage the highly placed officials of "track one" in the exploratory dialogues of unofficial "track two" diplomacy for "track one-and-a-half" diplomacy.

The Abkhaz, Georgian, Russian, and South Ossetian leaders could each send trusted advisors to a series of such dialogues with an open-ended instruction to explore - without commitment - how all groups could collaborate to satisfactorily meet everyone's needs.

In the context of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict that first evolved into war in 1991, followed by a ceasefire in 1992, influential Georgians and South Ossetians participated in a series of four unofficial facilitated dialogues from 1996 to 1998 to keep the ceasefire alive by providing useful input to the official negotiations process. 

For example, after a workshop exercise in which pairs of Georgians and South Ossetians together crafted statements that might de-escalate the conflict, the Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution used phrases from this exercise in his speech in Geneva.

Another dialogue series took place between a mix of new senior participants over three meetings in 2006 and 2007. Initiatives like these can make a difference but require ongoing support and nurturing.

A more sustained commitment to peace negotiations and a multi-level dialogue series by all parties and the international community might prevent the next war.

It's time to try again.

* Susan Allen Nan is Assistant Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. George Khutsishvili directs the International Center on Conflict and Negotiation in Tbilisi. Lira Kozaeva Tskhovrebova chairs the Association of Women of South Ossetia for Democracy and Human Rights in Tskhinvali. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service.