Dr. Cory Welt is a specialist on Georgia and the Caucasus and Associate Director of the Eurasian Strategy Project at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. Cory Welt visited Georgia to participate in the international conference entitled the Birth of Modern Georgia. The Georgian Times caught up with Dr. Cory Welt in the Tbilisi Marriott Hotel on October 15 to learn the view from Washington about Georgia US relations and much more.


Q: During her recent visit to Moscow US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talked about the importance of creating buffer zones to prevent a resumption of the conflicts in Georgia. How plausible is this in your view?

A: As we have seen from experience in dealing with the Russian Government there are some expectations of exchanges of opinion on what will encourage Moscow to agree to these arrangements being held. The US has changed its plans for the missile shield, and this was something very important for the Russian Government. One would expect that there will be a very clear, very forthright response to the steps that the US Government has taken. One most logical place for response would be in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and hopefully the Russian Government will begin discussing the presence of international monitors in these regions.

Q: How would that benefit Georgia?

A: There is no question that it’s extremely important to expand the international presence in the zone between the regions. The EUMM is doing as good a good job as it can but it’s just too small in parallel to the broader presence of involving other international organisations. From Tbilisi’s perspective greater presence in the buffer zones will certainly be welcomed but the real key is to have this presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The great challenge is in convincing particularly the Russian leadership, as well as the leadership of those regions, to allow this presence.

Q: Does this idea contain any threat to Georgia? Will not it somehow legitimise the occupation of these regions?

A: Not at all. There has been a history of conflict zones in which international presences do not legitimise borders in any way. They maintain the status quo prior to a final settlement. Clearly anything will be better than a unilateral Russian presence in these regions. One would think of Kosovo in the first place as an exanple of a place where this has been done but we can also find examples in Kurdistan and Cyprus. Conflicts go in many different directions and there is no reason to think that the ultimate settlement will go in the same direction as with Kosovo.

Q: The Secretary of State said that the US would provide military assistance to Georgia. The real concern however is where will this support end?

A: It’s a very important question and also a difficult one, as the US Government has been struggling with how precisely to move forward with military assistance. Certainly there has been a consensus on - as we have already seen - the beginning of military cooperation and training with regard to missions in Afghanistan and the like. This is important, and continues to be important, for the Georgian military and not very controversial. [But] the questions of equipment and such are to be addressed later. We understand how important this is for the Georgian Government. But at the same time there is a recognition of the potential for danger and conflict which will arise with an increase in the amount of weaponry in the region, no matter how justified the increase is. It is a very careful path which the US Government and Georgia will have to try to tread.

Q: President Obama’s decision to scrap the missile plan in Europe has earned mixed reactions worldwide. Some view it as a U.S. concession to Russia – an attempt at a quid pro quo in return for Russia’s support for tougher sanctions against Iran. How likely is Russia to act on its rhetoric and vote for stiffer sanctions against Iran?

A: We still need to wait and see. If the Russian approach to Iran changes, that would be something the US Government would welcome. It’s not a problem for the Russian Government to become more constructive in international discussions and negotiations. The Russian Government probably imagines that the process of deciding what to do with regard to Iran is going to be very long. I am fairly confident that whatever key European states will decide to do the Russians would also join in. The real challenge continues to be for the US to act in tandem with France, Germany and the UK, and coordinated policy is what the Russians would feel more obligated to participate in and feel more comfortable with, rather than something imposed by the US, or something the US attempts to impose unilaterally.

Q: The EU war probe commission has recently published its report, which some say is quite unfavourable to the Georgian Government. Will the EU report affect in any way the US and Europe’s attitudes and policy towards Tbilisi?

A: We should view the EU report as the end of a cycle of political discussions and debate on Georgia. It is not the beginning of a movement forward. It was completely unsurprising that the EU report would cast blame on several parties. It did not contain anything new. It essentially synthesized all the information which was out there. We may disagree with certain of its conclusions and interpretations. In terms of impact on policy it is not a starting point. US policy has been strong over the years and EU policies, Eastern Partnership and some others, continue to deepen and grow. It’s no secret that many in the US and Europe think that mistakes were made and the Georgian Government could have responded to Russian or Ossetian activities in a different manner but none of this has changed the view of Georgia regionally or in the international system. It does not change anyone’s views with regard to the potential for Russian aggression in the future that somehow needs to be contained.

Q: Many analysts believe that relations between Georgia and the US were overly personalised and personal connections between Saakashvili and some people in Washington might have played some role in starting the war. What do you think?

A: I think the claims about personal relationships are rather exaggerated. There were of course warm relations between President Bush and President Saakashvili. But before that we have to remember that there were warm relationship between President Shevardnadze and President Clinton. We often have warm relationships with the countries we consider our strategic partners. But US policy makers have been very consistent in communicating with the Georgian Government that the US would not be able to help, certainly militarily, to prevent any Russian action.

Q: Moreover, it is suggested that the Obama administration should clearly demarcate its support for Georgia from support of Mikheil Saakashvili and demand higher standards of democracy from Saakashvili in return for its support. Do you think the White House has made this message clear enough for Tbilisi?

A: There is no doubt that the US supports Georgia and the continued development of its democratic institutions. It should be no surprise for the population to see the US Government establish warm relations with other Governments. The US is sending a clear message that the US promotes institutional support, electoral reform, constitutional reform. It lays great emphasis on how these institutions and reforms go forward. I know that there was some disappointment [in what some perceived as] the lack of support by the US and Europe for opposition politics here. But the key to remember is that Europeans and the US support opposition politics very much as part of the political system. Although the opposition is frustrated with the political system, to the extent to which they play into it they can be sure that they have the full support of Europeans and the US.

Q: But don’t some political parties enjoy more sympathy in Washington than others? Irakli Alasania’s, for instance...

A: We also have to keep in mind that Georgians themselves are extraordinarily talented at gaining friends, and just as Shevardnadze was active in Western capitals Saakashvili has been active, Nino Burjanadze has been active and Irakli Alasania is also a known figure. Much of this is the result of the efforts of particular opposition figures themselves and their past professional experiences. But there is no preference for one or another in the US. This is something that needs to be very well understood. There is no effort being made by the US Government to try and prepare any kind of future Georgian Government. It’s only interested in who comes into Government through the electoral system.

Q: US Vice President Joe Biden was more critical of the performance of the Ukrainian Government that that of Georgia. The opposition expected Biden would make more strongly-worded statements about Saakashvili’s administration. Why did he not do so?

A: Vice-President Biden was very well of his responsibility to deliver a number of messages while he was here in Tbilisi. He was very clear that he wanted to send a message on to move forward to democratisation, to communicate that democracy is not built in a day. But at the same time he knew that Georgia is in a rather precarious situation regionally, with Russian forces just an hour or so away from Tbilisi. This is not the situation that Ukraine finds itself in. So it was also very much important to communicate that the US supports the State. Some might have wished for a more critical statement, but frankly the US felt that it delivered one of the most critical statements in all the history of US-Georgia relations. Biden meant very much what he said. The challenge is for the US Government and the diplomatic community here to follow through on the statements that the Vice President made, to make sure that the Government here understands that all of these efforts it has made to promote new democratic reforms should not just be words, but action.

Q: In an email interview with The Georgian Times a year ago you noted that Georgia should continue its path to European integration to make itself attractive to its breakaway republics. What is your view a year later? Where are we on the path of European integration?

A: I felt before the war that it was necessary to come up with creative ways to reestablish relations with the Abkhaz and South Ossetians while pushing back any kind of final settlement. After the war this has become much more difficult – if not impossible. Much more time needs to pass before we can think of any kind of normalisation here, which unfortunately leaves Georgia in the situation where the only way to settle its conflicts is through further integration with Europe. This will not end with membership of the EU anytime soon, but in Georgia being a staunch member of the trans-Atlantic and European community.

It’s probably too optimistic to say that Georgia will become the vibrant economy which suddenly attracts Abkhazia and South Ossetia overnight. The leadership needs to offer other incentives to persuade them to make this choice. Practically speaking the best that can be hoped for now is a normalisation of situation but this will require much greater Russian commitment. This will not be much welcomed but it is an important thing to hope for, regardless of what’s happening in these regions or with the Russian Presidency.